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Thirsty cities
Who owns the right to water?
Dora Apel
Human right or corporate right?
Is access to clean water a basic human right or is water a commodity to be bought and sold by
corporations? Should water be part of a democratic public commons or should water distribu-
tion be run like a business that values the bottom line over public health and human lives,
denying water to those who cannot afford it? As clean water becomes increasingly scarce, water
access and control become more urgent. Globally, the scale of ecological dispossession through
corporate control of water, combined with chemical agriculture, the destructive diversion of
water through large dam projects, and the climate chaos produced by greenhouse gas
emissions, has led to the creation of deserts, the depletion of rivers and lakes, widespread
disease, battles and wars (often masked as ethnic or religious conﬂicts), and a massive
refugee crisis. Environmental activist Maude Barlow asserts that “The global water crisis
has become the most powerful symbol of the growing inequality in our world”, based on the
three fundamental water crises that pose a threat to the survival of the world’s populations:
dwindling freshwater supplies, inequitable access to water, and the corporate control of
water (Barlow, 2007: 1, 142). Yet to many, the global water crisis remains largely invisible.
As case studies, Flint and Detroit provide object lessons in how we use water, distribute it,
contaminate it, and waste it, while also demonstrating that water crises are not only local but
have wide-ranging implications. They provide object lessons about problems whose solutions
hinge on whether we view water as a free right and human commons or as a corporate right.
Although it is the poor and marginalized in declining cities and regions who suffer most at this
point, ultimately, the effects of water scarcity will cross race and class lines, countries and
continents, and once water has been depleted, it cannot be replenished.
Approximately an hour apart in the state of Michigan, Detroit and Flint are impoverished
majority black cities that have become emblematic of urban centers seen by the neoliberal
state as proﬁt-making opportunities with expendable populations. The state’s Republican
Governor Rick Snyder suspended democracy in both cities when he voided the powers of
the elected mayors and city councils and instead appointed emergency managers to run
the cities, who were accountable only to himself. In Detroit, the emergency manager (EM)
turned off water for 20,000 residents before giving control back to the mayor (who then
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-2 continued the water shutoffs). In Flint, the EM recommended switching the city’s water
source to the polluted and highly corrosive Flint River, which caused massive damage to
an already crumbling infrastructure, an outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease, and the lead
poisoning of the water, potentially exposing the city’s 100,000 residents, with especially
devastating effects on its children.
Flint: public health and the bottom line
Shortly after the EM switched Flint’s drinking water source from the Detroit Water and
Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River in March 2014, residents began
complaining that the dirty brown and foul smelling water coming out of their taps
caused chemical burns and skin rashes, caused their hair to fall out, and made them ill
in other ways. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and other
ofﬁcials repeatedly and falsely reassured city residents for eighteen months that the water
was safe for drinking, cooking, and bathing. How could this happen?
Flint ofﬁcials decided to draw water from the Flint River rather than the DWSD while
the new Karegnondi pipeline connecting Genesee County to Lake Huron was built,
calculating that they would save about ﬁve million dollars. The cost for the Karegnondi
(from the Petan Indian language meaning “lake” and an early name for Lake Huron)
pipeline was calculated at $285 million and the entity in charge of building it was the
quasi-public Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). The cost of Flint’s share of the new
pipeline was $85 million, a price the bankrupt city could not pay.
Jeff Wright, the Genesee County drain commissioner and KWA CEO, spearheaded the
drive to build the new pipeline. Wright argued that it would save Flint money because the
DSWD was price-gouging the city: “Detroit charged whatever Detroit felt like charging for
drinking water, and our community was forced to pay whatever it cost” (Guyette, 2017). As
Curt Guyette (2017), an investigative reporter for the ACLU ofMichigan, points out, Wright’s
complaint ignored the fact ofMichigan law, which requires public water departments to charge
municipalities only what it costs to treat and deliver water to its customers. Thus, like most
public utilities, the DWSD is highly regulated and prohibited from making a proﬁt. Where
there are disputes over costs and reasonable rates, the DWSDmay be challenged in court. The
mayor of Flint at the time, Dayne Walling, was chair of the KWA board, and the governor
appointed a former interim mayor as Flint’s EM. Both strongly supported the KWA pipeline.
Were they acting as watchdogs for the city or were they, along with KWA CEO Jeff Wright,
seeking ways to secure political inﬂuence?
The KWA did not need Flint’s participation to build the new pipeline, but it did need the
city’s approval to increase the diameter of the pipeline. In this one instance, the EM gave
power back to the mayor and city council in a ceremonial vote for widening the pipeline,
hoping this would prevent any future court challenges. Although they expected a quick
decision, the process took more than a year. During this time, the governor asked the DWSD
to come up with a new cost-saving proposal. “That proposal, according to the DWSD”, writes
Guyette (2017), “would save Flint and the Genesee County more than $900 million as
compared to the KWA alternative over the 30-year contract period”.
Yet the new Flint EM ﬂatly rejected the offer. Despite the prevailing narrative that Flint
was bankrupt and switching water sources to save money, the EM dismissed the cost-
saving proposal by the DWSD that undermined the rationale for the switch. In addition,
no one addressed the problem of Flint not having the money to pay its $85 million share
of the KWA pipeline. It appears, then, that the switch was not about saving money at all;
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-2 instead, it seems intended to ﬁll the campaign coffers of the politicians who supported the
new pipeline by the private companies that would build it.
The decision about where Flint would get its water ultimately rested with the Michigan
Department of Treasury. Despite the fact that no plan existed for ﬁnancing the KWA option,
or that the DWSD plan was cheaper, the Treasurer accepted the EM’s recommendation to
proceed with the KWA. When ofﬁcials ﬁnalized the KWA agreement, the contract stipulated
that Flint use the river as a temporary water source until the KWAwater became available.
The ﬁrst problem following the switch to the Flint River was that the water was infested
with bacteria such as e-coli derived from fecal matter, and other toxins. Chlorine dumped into
the water to deal with this problem then caused the production of cancer-causing chemicals
called trihalomethanes (TTHMs), which affect the liver and kidneys (Democracy Now!,
2016). A deadly outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease, which is caused by a water-borne bacteria,
spread throughout the city, killing at least twelve people and affecting seventy-eight more
(DeVito, 2017). While this was occurring, the river water, to which the city had added no anti-
corrosive, proceeded to corrode Flint’s aging water pipes and to poison the drinking water
with high levels of lead. In one home, an EPA manager detected lead levels seven times
greater than the EPA’s acceptable limit of 15 parts per billion. AVirginia Tech research team
found that 40% of Flint homes had elevated levels of lead, with some homes at 13,200 parts
per billion. But the DEQ expressed skepticism about the study to the Flint Journal.
Lead is a powerful neurotoxin that affects every system in the body and is especially
harmful to pregnant women and children, where it can cause irreversible developmental
delays because of damage to developing brains and nervous systems. In 2015, a research
team at a local health center found that the proportion of children with elevated lead
levels in their blood had nearly doubled since the water switchover, affecting around 9000
children under the age of six (Moore, 2016; NOVA, 2017).
Finally, in October 2015, Snyder signed a bill appropriating $9.35 million, almost
double the alleged “savings” of switching to river water in the ﬁrst place, to reconnect the
city to the Detroit water system. In the following months, both the city mayor and Snyder
declared a state of emergency, the National Guard was mobilized to distribute bottled
water, and a federal investigation began.
The corrosion of the city’s lead water pipes would not have occurred if an anti-
corrosive had been added to the water, as required by federal law for large municipal
systems. Why did the DEQ fail to add this crucial and inexpensive corrosion control
chemical? At ﬁrst, ofﬁcials claimed there was an anti-corrosive plan, then that they had
misunderstood the federal law, and ﬁnally that they were concerned an anti-corrosive
would foster bacteria (Kaffer, 2016; NOVA, 2017). The DEQ knew there was a problem
with lead contamination because they consistently tried to manipulate water safety tests
by avoiding homes that had already tested high for lead and instructing city residents to
ﬂush their lines before collecting water samples, which would dilute the lead readings
(NOVA, 2017).
The reason for the failure to add corrosion control ﬁnally became clear in testimony at
a legislative hearing in March 2016. A reporter explained, “When Flint began to pump
drinking water from the Flint River, the city’s water treatment plant wasn’t capable of
adding corrosion control treatment, not without equipment upgrades the broke city
couldn’t afford” (Kaffer, 2016). Thus, the city switched its water source to the highly
corrosive river knowing it could not afford to update the water treatment plant to provide
corrosion control. In order to claim that the switch would save money, ofﬁcials omitted
the cost of updating the water treatment plant from the ﬁnancial calculations. That cost
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-2 has been estimated at $108 million, in addition to the $85 million (Fonger, 2017). This
deliberate evasion and the collusion of the DEQ clearly suggests motives for the switch
other than saving money or safeguarding public health.
In February 2015, Flint ofﬁcials hired Veolia North America, a division of the French
conglomerate that is the largest private water company in the world, to conduct a study of
the city’s water for $40,000. While making a series of minor recommendations, Veolia
announced in its report the following month that the water quality was “in compliance
with State and Federal regulations”, including nothing about corrosion or elevated lead
levels, and thereby reinforcing the position of the DEQ and city ofﬁcials (Veolia, 2015).
Veolia afterwards proposed more extensive work for an estimated $1.8 million, which the
city declined (Smith and Bosman, 2016).
Cities cannot be run like corporations. To thrive, they must sustain the life and wellbeing of
the community through access to essential resources like clean water and services such as
education and health care. To run the city as a corporation and focus exclusively on the
bottom line means sacriﬁcing residents seen as “surplus” and “expendable” – people who may
therefore be allowed to suffer slower or faster deaths from the harmful effects of poisoned
water. Not just in Flint, but also in other cities across the nation, state and local ofﬁcials have
compromised the welfare of citizens. According to a report by the Natural Resources Defense
Council (Khan, 2016), more than 18 million Americans received their drinking water from
systems with lead violations in 2015. This is a conservative estimate and the number is
actually thought to be higher, because many cities that are gaming the system and avoiding
corrosion control, including Flint, are not entered into the EPA’s database. Moreover,
enforcement is lax, further helping to create unsafe drinking water conditions for millions of
people. Nonetheless, the 18 million who drank lead-contaminated water are part of a larger
estimate of 77 million people served by drinking water systems with other contaminants,
including arsenic and dangerous bacteria (WJBD, 2017). About 70% of these people live in
smaller cities and rural communities, leading to a two-tiered system of inequality that has only
worsened under the Trump administration as cuts to the EPA cause cuts to drinking water
programs and further encourage privatization and other cost-cutting measures.
The buying of political inﬂuence that helped trigger the Flint ﬁasco was revealed in an
ACLU analysis of contributions to the 2016 political campaign by KWA CEO Jeff Wright
for the position of Genesee County drain commissioner. The study shows that of the
nearly $270,000 he raised, at least $188,000, or roughly 70%, came from political action
committees and employees of companies doing business directly with KWA or working
on the pipeline in some capacity. One of Wright’s biggest contributors was a Houston-
based engineering and project management ﬁrm that was one of KWA’s primary contrac-
tors and helped conduct a 2009 study asserting the value of leaving the Detroit system and
building its own pipeline. This company, along with other ﬁrms involved in the study,
helped build the KWA pipeline, which was completed in 2017 (Guyette, 2017).
The tragedy of Flint is that it was an avoidable and knowing failure of government,
produced by a combination of greed, political power grabbing, and indifference to the public
health and safety of the poor and majority black city. Only a few months after the switch,
when General Motors factory executives complained to Governor Snyder that the river water
was corroding their car parts when washed on the assembly line, Snyder quietly spent
$440,000 to switch the plant back to Lake Huron (DWSD) water, while keeping Flint’s
residents on the corrosive river water (Moore, 2016).
Appointed Flint city ofﬁcials, the DEQ, and the State of Michigan are all responsible
for the ﬁasco, along with the EPA’s Michigan regional administrator, who colluded in the
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-2 disaster and has since resigned, plus the federal EPA, which also was complicit and
responded too slowly. Ultimately, however, responsibility lies at the feet of Governor
Snyder and the neoliberal ideology he upholds. After taking ofﬁce in 2011, Snyder got the
Republican legislature to award the wealthy and corporations enormous tax breaks, and
then slashed public services such as schools, welfare, pensions, and safe drinking water to
compensate for the lost revenue. It was Snyder who suspended democracy for four years
and put Flint’s fate in the hands of a series of appointed emergency managers whose job
was to do what seemed cheapest, most expedient, and corporate-friendly. And it was
Snyder who prioritized removing environmental safeguards: a 2012 statement entitled
“Energy and the Environment” announced the elimination of more than 100 environ-
mental regulations and cuts to staff levels at the DEQ and other “quality of life” agencies,
in advance of similar appalling policies under the Trump administration.
Structural racism is also clearly at work (see Hammer, 2016). The Michigan Civil
Rights Commission, which spent nearly a year investigating the crisis to see if racism
played any role in the ﬁasco, issued a report determining that in a black-majority city with
a poverty rate of 40%, where democracy was curtailed and replaced by state-appointed
emergency managers, racism and political inﬂuence-buying took precedence over serving
the public good. The Commission wrote that such a crisis could not have occurred in
afﬂuent white Michigan cities, and asserted, “The lack of political clout left the residents
with nowhere to turn, no way to have their voices heard” (Guyette, 2017). The role of
structural racism in placing proﬁt above the welfare of citizens is increasingly visible
across the nation as it becomes increasingly destructive.
Flint residents fought back, however, with protests, citizen journalism, a new mayor,
and a massive resident testing project, which turned the Flint disaster into a national
scandal and brought renewed attention to the problems of clean water, ofﬁcial malfea-
sance, and lead poisoning.
In June 2016, new Flint Mayor Karen Weaver announced that the city was legally
bound to the KWA contract despite the fact that a 2016 analysis of Flint water rates
predicted that water bills for the city’s residents, already among the highest in the nation,
would double by 2022 under KWA. However, ten months later Weaver announced support
for a plan to stay permanently with the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA), who had
served as Flint’s temporary water source after the city abandoned river water. The GLWA
took over the DWSD regional water structure during the Detroit bankruptcy and became
the provider of wholesale water and sewer services to member communities in Southeast
Michigan in 2017. This new plan would reportedly save $1.8 million annually over the
life of a new thirty-year contract compared to staying with KWA (WXYZ, 2017). It took
the city council another seven months to approve the plan because members were
concerned that it would keep high water rates in place for residents for years. The truth
is that, no matter which system is in place, water rates far exceed the national average.
The Flint water crisis is a warning about what is at stake when cities lose democratic
control over their resources. By some estimates, it will cost $1.5 billion to upgrade the
entire system and provide services to those affected by lead poisoning (NOVA, 2017). Far
from saving money for the city of Flint, the real costs of this catastrophe in ﬁnancial terms
are exponentially higher than any alleged savings ever could have been, and in human terms
the cost is incalculable. Although Flint returned to the regional system that provided clean
water for nearly ﬁfty years in 2015, city water still must be ﬁltered for it to be safe to drink
while the corroded lead service lines are replaced, and many are still afraid to use the water.
There are also major problems with the city water mains, which leak 40 to 50% of the
Thirsty cities
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-2 treated water that is pumped into them, and there are 20,000 lead service lines corroded by
the river that need to be replaced, a process that will take years. Many residents stopped
paying for their poisoned water, but controversy arose again when the city warned 8000
homeowners that tax liens would be placed on their homes if they were more than six
months behind on their water accounts, making them vulnerable to home foreclosure
(Delaney, 2017). Despite the continued need for water ﬁlters, the water was ofﬁcially
declared safe in 2017 (although no blood level of lead is safe), four years after the switch to
river water.
Four government ofﬁcials, one from the city of Flint, two from the DEQ, and one from
the EPA, resigned over the mishandling of the crisis, and one more DEQ staff member
was ﬁred. Investigations continue at the federal, state, and local levels, and so far ﬁfteen
current and former state and local ofﬁcials have been criminally indicted in connection to
the disaster. Five of them have been charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection
with the deaths from Legionnaire’s disease, including the head of the state’s health
department, who did not warn the public about increases in the disease for a year after
he knew about it and said, “Everyone has to die of something” (Atkinson and Davey,
2017). Four ofﬁcials, including two of the city’s former emergency managers, have been
criminally charged with using false pretenses to obtain the loan needed by the city to
ﬁnance its portion of the KWA option (Guyette, 2017). The Michigan attorney general is
suing Veolia, as well as the company Lockwood, Andrews, and Newnam, which had been
hired to advise the city about the switch in water sources. Nationally, environmental
activists and the Massachusetts attorney general have accused Veolia of violations that
include polluting waterways and overbilling customers, leading to lawsuits in courts
around the country (Smith and Bosman, 2016).
In a powerful visual statement about race and second-class citizenship, New Orleans-
based artist Ti-Rock Moore’s artwork Flint depicts a water fountain with a constant stream
of brown running water under a plaque that says “Colored”. It was displayed at the
international art competition ArtPrize in Grand Rapids, Michigan (20 September – 8
October 2017). Recalling the segregated water fountains of the Jim Crow era and the
brutal inequality that segregation signiﬁed, Moore’s work poignantly evokes the long legacy
of American racist oppression in the poisoned water of the majority black city of Flint.
Detroit shutoffs: prelude to privatization?
The DWSD has not been immune to corruption. Suburban leaders have long criticized the
DWSD for its annual rate increases and what many considered questionable contracting
practices. In the 1980s, the head of the water department was imprisoned for taking bribes
from a sludge-hauling company. More recently, department head Victor Mercado, who
was appointed by former Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, pleaded guilty to illegally steering
contracts to a crony of Kilpatrick’s in one of the largest corruption scandals in the city’s
history.
In March 2014, when Flint left the Detroit water system, the DWSD asserted that half
of its 323,000 accounts in Detroit were delinquent and began turning off water for up to
3000 residents every week while EM Kevyn Orr requested proposals from private water
companies interested in the DWSD (Gaist, 2014). The following September, the EM and
federal bankruptcy mediators constructed a deal in which the DWSD was forced to lease
its regional water infrastructure to the GLWA as part of a restructuring plan that also
undermined unions, eliminated jobs, and reduced city pensions. The EM used the
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bankruptcy crisis to engineer the transfer of control of Detroit’s water out of the city’s
hands in an action that may be read as a move toward the privatization of water, a policy
supported by the Obama administration through the Water Resources Reform and Devel-
opment Act of June 2014. This act dismantles restrictions on private investment in public
utilities contained in the Clean Water Act and other federal legislation. The new act
encourages ﬁnancially strapped cities to enter “public-private partnerships” as federal and
state funding for infrastructure declines (White, 2014). Public-private partnerships, while
Figure 2.1 Ti-Rock Moore, Flint, 2016. Photo courtesy of the artist.
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-2 suggesting accountability, actually disguise and promote the privatization of public
services. Obama’s appointee at the EPA, who was complicit in covering up the lead
poisoning of Flint residents, pushed for the privatization of essential social services, from
public education to water systems (Brewer and White, 2016).
Under the regional authority agreement signed by Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan and
three area counties, the GLWA has a forty-year lease for pipelines servicing suburban
communities, at a cost of $50 million per year. A six-member board of appointed ofﬁcials
makes decisions on water rates, contracts, labor agreements, and the privatization of
services. The agreement overrides Detroit City Council’s right to approve privatization of
any portion of the water system, which, according to the City Charter, also must be
approved by a majority of city voters in a regular or special election (White, 2014). By
superseding these provisions, the new arrangement allows the future privatization of the
GLWA at the mandate of an unelected board.
Like Flint’s EM, Orr then contracted Veolia North America to recommend cost-
savings for Detroit’s water system. This raises more critical questions. Is it a
coincidence that pulling Flint out of the Detroit water system and depriving the
DWSD of a large share of revenue helped cause the crisis that justiﬁed creating the
GLWA and calling in Veolia? Is it a coincidence that Veolia is a major client of the
Jones Day global law ﬁrm for which Orr works? Is it a coincidence that when Veolia
was called in, water already had been shut off for nearly 20,000 households? Was this
an attempt to eliminate “bad debt” and clear the way for reﬁnancing and privatization,
as many observers have suggested? Under Victor Mercado, who had previously worked
for the private water company Thames Water North America, the DWSD shut off
water for 40,000 people.
Many of the water cutoffs impacted children, allowing child welfare authorities to
remove them from their homes, since working utilities in all homes with children are
legally required. The water shutoffs left everyone, including the sick, without water to
drink, without toilets, and without the ability to cook or bathe. No such cutoffs were
implemented for large corporations and institutions, such as the Red Wings’ hockey arena
and the Ford football stadium, which were also delinquent on their bills, and thousands of
vacant and abandoned buildings with water often gushing through broken pipes (Apel,
2015: 32).
A recent study conducted by researchers from Henry Ford Health System’s Global
Health Initiative (Plum et al., 2017) found a signiﬁcant relationship between water
shutoffs imposed by the City of Detroit and water-related illnesses experienced by a
sample of Henry Ford Hospital patients, including skin and soft tissue infections and
water-borne bacterial infections. Researchers analyzed data from more than 37,000 cases
of water-borne illness for over a year starting in January 2015, which was then compared
with a list of Detroit addresses whose water had been shut off. Even accounting for the
effects of poverty, the study shows a clear connection between water-related illnesses and
shutoffs.
United Nations investigators denounced the water shutoffs as a human rights violation,
asserting, “Disconnections due to non-payment are only permissible if it can be shown
that the resident is able to pay but is not paying. In other words, when there is genuine
inability to pay, human rights simply forbids disconnections” (OHCHR, 2014). The city
maintained it was responding to unpaid bills, but this turned out not to be entirely true, as
even residents with up-to-date bills had their water shut off. Matthew Kovac (2015) notes
that Detroit ofﬁcials did not know exactly whose water they were shutting off, but, like
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-2 banks that engaged in wrongful home foreclosures when they saw an opportunity to seize
people’s homes, they did not really care. Instead, they saw an opportunity to drive out
low-income African Americans in order to clear the way for urban “development” and an
inﬂux of young white professionals, in a form of “hyper-gentriﬁcation” (see Apel, 2015:
31–3). As environmentalist Martin Lukacs observes,
. . . more than half of the city’s commercial and industrial users are also owing – a
sum totaling $30 million. But no contractors have showed up on their doorstep. The
targeting of Detroit families is about something else. It is a ruthless case of the shock
doctrine – the exploitation of natural or unnatural shocks of crisis to push through
pro-corporate policies that couldn’t happen in any other circumstance.
(Nichols, 2014)
In response to growing national pressure over the mounting Detroit water crisis, full-
scale media coverage, and a series of protest actions in Detroit, including a mass protest
organized by National Nurses United, the largest labor union of registered nurses in the
country, EM Orr ﬁnally announced a moratorium on shutoffs and relinquished control
over the DWSD to the city’s Mayor Duggan. Duggan himself, however, also has a history
of supporting privatization, having overseen the sale of the nonproﬁt Detroit Medical
Center to a for-proﬁt hospital conglomerate in Virginia. Not surprisingly, water cutoffs
eventually continued under Duggan.
Many who have bought inexpensive homes in Detroit have unwittingly inherited
responsibility for water bills amounting to thousands of dollars. Despite pledges by
city ofﬁcials that water shutoffs would decline, they instead rose by 18% in 2016,
denying water to an additional 27,000 Detroit homes, a ratio of one in ﬁve. By the end
of 2017, Detroit had shut off water to more than 100,000 homes (Kurth, 2017).
Moreover, residents who cannot afford increases in their water bills have been further
threatened with foreclosure through liens on their homes, like many Flint residents.
Critics also note the intensiﬁcation of the crisis under the city’s “10/30/50” payment
plan:
[T]hose delinquent on their water bills are required to pay 10 percent of the overdue
bill up front, with the remainder spread over a 24-month period on top of the regular
already-unaffordable monthly bill. [I]n a city with an ofﬁcial poverty rate of 40
percent, avoiding a shutoff means increasing one’s monthly payments for two years.
City residents already pay water bills that are nearly twice the national average and
this year [2015] rates went up another 3.4 percent for water and 16.7 percent for
sewerage! This plan is a mathematical algorithm designed to suck the maximum
amount of money from poor residents before they are shut off completely. Fifty cents
of every dollar collected by DWSD goes directly to ﬁnance debt principally owned
by wealthy bondholders, big banks and hedge funds.
(Martin, 2017)
Without a progressive water rate in place to insure that all families can afford water,
the crisis will continue. The Detroit City Council in 2006 adopted such a plan, the Water
Affordability Program, to create a safety net allowing low-income residents to pay on the
basis of their income, but the plan was signiﬁcantly downgraded by DWSD head Victor
Mercado, and cut altogether during bankruptcy proceedings. Detroiters, who have been
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-2 ﬁghting for the right to water for years, need a water affordability program enacted and
current assistance programs expanded.
The problem of water affordability is by no means unique to Detroit or Flint. In 2015,
water was cut off to 25,000 households in Baltimore in a similar assault on low-income
people and African Americans; in Cleveland, 44,000 homes were sent shutoff notices in
2016 and over 8000 people lost their homes through foreclosure because of tax liens for
non-payment of water bills. Data analysis by Bridge Magazine (Martin, 2017) reports that
“some studies have forecasted that water prices could quadruple in the next 20 years”, and
notes that cities such as Austin, Charlotte, Chicago, San Francisco, and Tucson “have all
experienced water rate hikes of over 50% in the past ﬁve years”. This suggests that one-
third of households in the US may not be able to pay for water by 2020.
The bigger picture: planetary urbanization
In the face of water shutoffs, water contamination, and lack of access to clean water,
neoliberal narratives seek to marginalize and isolate low-income people as responsible for
their own problems or as unfortunate victims of “innocent errors” or decisions for which
the corporations and the state take no responsibility. Such narratives serve to legitimize
the treatment of poor, black, and immigrant populations in deindustrialized cities as
“disposable” and “surplus populations”, and to justify the transfer of infrastructural
resources out of their control with a goal of future privatization.
Food & Water Watch, which has helped stop almost forty privatization efforts and
ﬁghts for local, public, and democratic control of water, conducted a comprehensive
survey of the 500 largest US water systems. They found that, on average, private systems
charge 59% more than public systems (Grant and Miles, 2016). Privatized water services
not only have higher costs, but also worse services, proﬁt-motivated decision making, and
less accountability. This means they cut corners, respond slowly to service requests, and
Figure 2.2 National protest against Detroit water shutoffs in downtown Detroit, 18 July 2014.
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-2 let infrastructure deteriorate in order to improve short-term proﬁts. They expand into
afﬂuent areas and cut back services in poor areas, where services are needed most, and
when problems occur, people have few options.
Moreover, these pushes for privatization are occurring at a time when crumbling
water infrastructure is pervasive. Most pipes were laid out in the thirty-year period
between 1920 and 1950, including those in cities such as Detroit, Los Angeles, and
Chicago. These water infrastructures are all likely to break down at about the same
time in the coming years (Cooper, 2009). The plastic and iron industries are currently
waging a $300 billion lobbying battle to replace the country’s deteriorating water and
sewer pipes in the next decade, driven by burst pipes, leaks, and public health scares
such as occurred in Flint (Tabuchi, 2017). A massive New Deal-style jobs program is
needed to get America’s old and leaky water infrastructure updated and the nation’s
drinking water systems able to deliver clean water to everyone. Instead, the Trump
administration announced plans in June 2017 to curtail the federal government’s role in
funding the nation’s infrastructure, calling on cities, states, and corporations to take on
the cost.
The selloff of public water systems, supported by both major political parties,
represents a form of social regression. Privately owned water systems became municipal
entities during the nineteenth century in response to the failure of private water companies
to adequately maintain infrastructure, meet sanitation needs, and provide services for the
masses of workers and residents gathering in cities. It was only through public ownership
that sanitary urban conditions and dependable access to water became possible. The turn
to neoliberal globalization and a “free market” agenda in the late twentieth century has
fostered the return to privately owned water systems and the growing water wars and
crises. In 1989, Margaret Thatcher’s government privatized all public water and sewerage
operations in England; Paris and Berlin privatized their water infrastructure in the 1990s.
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have aggressively insisted on water
privatization across Africa, India, South America, Eastern Europe, China, and Saudi
Arabia (Barlow, 2007: 36–8; Gaist, 2014; Shiva, 2016), causing ecological havoc and
making water inaccessible or unaffordable to millions of mostly poor people. The sale of
water systems to powerful water corporations such as Veolia and Suez provides huge
proﬁts for a tiny elite that claims the right to own and control water for the world, as if
water were a renewable resource to be bought and sold like t-shirts. As scientist and
activist Vandana Shiva (2016: 87) argues,
While privatization is generally couched in rhetoric about the disappearing role of the
state, what we actually see is increased state intervention in water policy, subverting
community control over water resources. Policies imposed by the World Bank, and
trade liberalization rules crafted by the World Trade Organization, are creating a
sweeping culture of corporate-states all over the world.
Further complicating the struggle of Michigan residents for control over their water,
the Swiss-based corporate giant Nestlé Waters has become the largest owner of private
water sources in the state. Nestlé has been embroiled for years in lawsuits over its water
bottling activities, which include pumping more than 200 gallons of fresh water per
minute out of wells in northern Michigan and selling it as Ice Mountain in the Upper
Midwest and as Pure Life nationally. In 2017, Nestlé applied to increase its pumping
allowance at its well in Evart, Michigan, by 60%.
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-2 Although Evart’s city manager supports the increased pumping allowance, claiming
that it provides economic development and has minimal ecological impact, thousands of
citizens vehemently oppose it, in part because Nestlé pays exactly nothing for the water
and only a $200 annual permit fee to pump from the nine wells it owns or leases. In a
state where cities like Flint and Detroit are in water crisis, many are outraged that a giant
bottling company can make enormous proﬁts for so little while depleting the Michigan
water table, which damages rivers, lakes, and streams, and impacts wetlands, ﬁsh
populations, and other wildlife. Operating at an immense scale, Nestlé packages an
average of 4.8 million bottles of water a day and plans a $36-million expansion for its
Michigan Ice Mountain bottling operations in Stanwood (Friess, 2017).
Not surprisingly, Nestlé has ties to the Snyder administration: Deb Muchmore, the
spokesperson in Michigan for Nestlé, is the wife of Dennis Muchmore, Snyder’s former
chief of staff, who was intimately involved in the Flint water switch. As celebrity
ﬁlmmaker and Flint activist Michael Moore notes (2016), “The Muchmores have a
personal interest in seeing to it that Nestlé grabs as much of Michigan’s clean water as
possible – especially when cities like Flint in the future are going to need that Ice
Mountain”. Indeed, the Detroit Free Press reported that in March 2015, Dennis Much-
more proposed spending $250,000 to buy bottled water from Nestlé or Absopure for the
citizens of Flint (Matheny and Egan, 2016).
As previous ecological victories of the 1980s continue to be rolled back by environ-
mental deregulation at the state and national levels, public health and the environment
continue to deteriorate. One of the ﬁrst acts of the Trump administration was to overturn a
late Obama-era regulation prohibiting surface-mining operations from dumping waste into
nearby waterways. Trump further proposed cutting funding to the Great Lakes Restoration
Initiative. The Great Lakes represent 21% of the world’s supply of natural fresh water,
especially critical at a time when the world is running out of this precious resource. The
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative was intended to clean up giant harmful algae blooms,
toxic shipping discharge, and invasive species. In 2014, toxic algae blooms in Lake Erie
contaminated water for 400,000 people in Michigan and Ohio and left them without
drinking water for three days, while some residents on the Canadian side of Lake Erie had
no drinking water for almost two weeks. Because of climate change, such algae blooms
are expected to become larger, more frequent, and more toxic. To make matters worse,
since 2000, Nestlé has been allowed to package and sell water from the Great Lakes
Basin (aquifers feeding the Great Lakes) for billions of dollars in proﬁts. Given the
growing dangers to the Great Lakes, the commercialization and export of Great Lakes
water is yet another threat to the 26 million people who depend on the Great Lakes Basin
for their water supply.
The pathways of capitalist development create dramatic transformations of the spaces
around cities, often at a considerable distance from them, including processing plants and
subterranean industrial infrastructure. The progressive industrialization and ruination of
the hinterland to support the extraction and bottling of water is a major destructive effect
of water privatization. Such colonization of the environment moots boundaries between
urban settlements and their allegedly non-urban exteriors and impacts millions of people
across state and national boundaries. This suggests the need for a new understanding of
urbanization that replaces the traditional concept of the city as circumscribed and
autonomous. As critical urban theorist Neil Brenner argues, the nineteenth-century
concept of the city as bounded and self-sufﬁcient has become obsolete as capitalism
produces “intensifying degradation of surrounding landscapes, ecosystems, watersheds,
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-2 rivers, seas and oceans through their intensifying role in supplying cities with fuel,
materials, water and food, and in absorbing their waste products” (2017: 217). Brenner
urges us to realize that we are witnessing “nothing less than the intensiﬁcation and
extension of capitalist urbanization at all spatial scales, across the planetary space as a
whole, including not only the earth’s terrestrial surfaces, but the underground, the oceans,
and even the atmosphere itself” (2017: 36). To conceptualize “planetary urbanization”, in
Brenner’s terms, is to recognize the way capitalist urbanization has already massively
transformed and degraded the environment, causing widespread and ongoing suffering
among the world’s populations.
Critical urban theory is a way of thinking about urbanization and its future founded on
a Marxist critique of capitalism in both spatial and political terms. Rethinking of the
urban imaginary began at least as far back as the 1970s with radical scholars such as
Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, among others, who shared a concern over the way that
cities under capitalism became key sites for commodiﬁcation processes. Such processes
focus on expanding proﬁts for a tiny percentage of the wealthy upper class even as they
lead to global economic crises such as that of 2007–2009, in which, among other effects,
millions of people lost their homes. Planetary urbanization points to the need for a vision
of urban life beyond capitalism as a structuring principle.
The linked crises in Flint, Detroit, the Great Lakes and many other cities and regions
pose the urgent question of a worldwide urban imaginary that takes into account the
importance of collective rather than private ownership of resources, responding to social
needs rather than capitalist proﬁt-making. Instead of trying to make capitalism “work
better” by regulating itself and reining in its own “excessive” greed, it must be recognized
that a liberal response such as this fails to see the problem as systemic rather than
individual. Capitalism is a system that depends on aggressive commodiﬁcation and an
expanding rate of proﬁt, and regards cities as vehicles of proﬁt for the few in a steadily
expanding network of exploitation. Planetary urbanization makes it clear that borders are
relatively meaningless, not only between hinterland and urban center, but among regions,
nations, and continents.
The continued pillaging and privatizing of water and other public utilities, as part of
the dispossession of common assets and publicly owned property for the purpose of
capitalist accumulation, will only lead to future catastrophes. Will the ﬁerce resistance
movements that have arisen around the globe to the corporate takeover of water be
sufﬁcient to stop water privatization and to establish water justice and water democracy?
Popular outrage generated by crises such as those produced in Detroit and Flint must
ultimately reckon with the rule of proﬁt over the economy as a whole and champion the
idea of cities for the beneﬁt of people, where the hopes and dreams of a productive and
creative life may be fulﬁlled. Access to clean water – like the fundamental need for
housing, jobs, public transportation, and access to education and healthcare – is a basic
human demand, yet its realization ultimately requires the economic and political reorga-
nization of society.
Conclusion
We cannot afford to let private interests seize and maintain global control of water for
their own proﬁt as the world runs out of freshwater and ever-greater numbers of
people live without access to clean water or simply cannot afford to pay for it.
The potentially irreversible ecological disaster caused by corporate control of the
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non-replaceable resource of water has positioned the global water crisis at the center
of the most pressing challenges we face today: diminishing fresh water, social
inequality, and the privatization of public resources and services. The appropriation
of water resources dispossesses people of their just share of natural resources and will
Figure 2.3 Exterior view of the Nestlé Waters Ice Mountain bottling plant near Stanwood,
Michigan.
Figure 2.4 Exterior view of the Nestlé Waters Ice Mountain bottling plant near Stanwood,
Michigan.
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-2 eventually destroy the planet. In response to planetary urbanization, an emancipatory
urban imaginary must be based on common public ownership of resources, managed
according to need and the public good rather than proﬁt, including the resource that is
the basis of all life: water.
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